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Abstract
The importance of Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari’s development
of ‘encounter’ is brought into sharp relief as key to the notion of
‘athleticism’. Here, each is developed as indispensable to the other,
forming an a-radical/ana-material groundless ground to power, politics,
literary sensibility, indeed sense itself. This nuanced encounter produces
an acephaletic knowledge, a body-knowledge, without the Ego-I. In an
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age of massifying systems, drone warfare and horrific migrations, where
corporate tentacles bend the rules akimbo, one finds that this turn to
a Deleuzian athleticism offers a different kind of political analysis, a
radical difference, which, despite (or because of) the odds, enables a
politics of hope and indeed, of a ‘becoming-human’.
Keywords: becoming-human, encounter, a-radical, ana-materialism,
groundless ground, leaders and led, hope
We are in danger, we are not enemies of yours, and in rejecting
us you will not only be failing to stop those who are your enemies
and aggressors, but also acquiescing in their building up of power from
your own empire. This is not right.
(Thucydides [431–11 BC] 2009, Book One, §35, p. 19)
In the everyday politics of mass murder, mass repression, mass sexual
assault and mass starvation, these violently dystopic hells unite in their
mass cruelty to create one thing rather effectively: they produce a blanket
nomadism, a de-territorialisation so profound as to force the nation-
state, its armies, legislators and its people (that is to say, ‘the people’)
into a wild, albeit ineffective, nonsense game of three halves. On the
one hand: an Us vs Them clarion call; on the other hand: a ‘not-in-my-
backyard’ ethnic cleanse; and on the third hand: a collective outpouring
of despair, fear, exhaustion, anger, nausea – label it as one may – all in
the name of this dying ember called ‘humanity’. Dotted amongst the
three halves exist the unnamed medics, journalists, artists, philosophers,
scientists, technicians, economists, housewives, poets, punks, little girls,
little boys, ballerinas, the diseased, the middle class, the poor, the once
well-healed, the queer – all now walking, swimming, drowning, crying,
reaching out, getting shot, moving on, being moved on. Handing out
blankets. Not giving up. Throwing in the towel. Prostrated, dead on a
beach.
Recorded warfare savagery and its consequences dating from at least
the twelfth century BC onward suggests the age-old question: was it not
ever thus? The short, easy, answer seems a resounding ‘yes’. The longer,
more accurate one, around which this essay cautiously unfolds, is ‘no,
not exactly’.
Three considerations will enter the fray. First, a remark on the
most fundamental law of politics (that there are always leaders vs
led), and more precisely, how Deleuze’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s
approach to that fundamental division enables a concept of difference
March 2, 2016 Time: 04:55pm dls.2016.0224.tex
In the Shadow of Akimbo Corporatism 263
that not only foregrounds sensuous, human agency but does so by
radically raising the bar (/); indeed, by removing it altogether. Theirs
is a rethinking of the encounter itself, not to mention this pock-marked
conceptual entity called ‘humanity’, as something much closer to bodies
without organs, planes of immanence, one might even say: quantum
entanglements, intensities and nomadically coded transformations quite
unlike the violent nomadism of a displaced and hunted people. Second
consideration: a remark on political activism, and more precisely,
activism in an age of akimbo corporatism, with its awkward and
bendy proliferations, sideways promises and slyly sanctioned warfare
strategies, including drone strikes, data mining, austerity and terror.
In so remarking, Deleuze’s concept of athleticism as a fluid, raw,
embodied logic (or logics) of sense, a multiple singularity, will be drawn
to the fore. As a living concept in the strongest, most corruptible
and terminal meaning of the word ‘body’, this athleticism will open
a tactical-strategic path that not only enables the becoming-human
of a people not yet invented but, in so doing, offers a powerful
antidote to the ever aggressive, homogenising triumphs of what can
best be described as populist Will – be it corporate, military, religious or
secular.
Against this behemoth of unrelenting massification with its seemingly
paradoxical handmaiden, violent inequality, Deleuze proposes an
athleticism nourished out of a certain kind of sensuous, sexual
fabulation; a ‘minor’ kind of literary (read: political) creation, a kind of
non-ego embodiment, one without completion or totalising mastery but
nevertheless able to invent, in this case, ‘a people’. It is an athleticism not
too far removed from the very meaning of revolutionary activity itself,
famously developed by a young Marx over 170 years ago in an attempt
to redress the woeful inadequacies of the, at the time, quite fashionable
turn to a neo-Hegelian contemplative speculative materialism, most
evident in the philosophical works by Ludwig Feuerbach on religion
and Christianity (Marx [1845/1888] 2010). As with so many before
Feuerbach, and as with so many more thereafter, ‘sensuousness’ was
to be linked to materiality via its interchangeable equivalence with
the very meaning of ‘humanity’ itself. This was a deeply scrubbed,
spiritually absolute, a conceptually ‘pure’ humanity, whose without-
sin sensuality could only be re-cognised in contemplation. On the
offensive, a rather droll Marx insists instead that this kind of neo-
Hegelian materiality ‘forgets the dirty-Jewish [sic]’ practical activities of
real, indeed, and more precisely, revolutionary change. Marx’s use of
sensuous in opposition to ‘contemplative’ is precisely the ‘dirt’, the ‘grit’
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and ‘art’ required for the overthrow of oppressive regimes, be they state,
family, religious or a combination of all three:
Thesis 1. In Das Wesen des Christenthums, [Feuerbach] therefore regards
the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice
is conceived and defined only in its ‘dirty-Jewish’ form of appearance.
Hence he does not grasp the significance of ‘revolutionary’ (that is)
of ‘practical-critical’, activity. [. . .] Thesis 5. Feuerbach, not satisfied
with abstract thinking, appeals to sensuous contemplation; but he does
not conceive sensuousness as practical, as human-sensuous activity. [. . .]
Thesis 9. The highest point of contemplative materialism, that is materialism,
which does not contemplate sensuousness as practical activity (but instead) is
the contemplation of single individuals in ‘civil’ society. (Marx [1845/1888]
2010: 7–8)
For Marx, this practical activity, this unquantifiable, non-metric, de-
mystified activity, this ability ‘not to forget’ that circumstances are not
made by luck, miracles or some omnipotent force, but emerge, are
maintained, re-staged and possibly overthrown via embodied, ‘down-
to-earth’ dreams, collective or otherwise, of what a people can become.
One could say, it is a kind of raw poetics that enables an ‘unsayable
something’ to enter into the picture, enables a people to invent anew,
the ‘whatever’, including humanity itself; to add life into what this
humanity may be or may become; to think outside the proverbial ‘box’
without lapsing into a pre-set agenda, zero-sum rationality or mystic
reverie. In his ‘Literature and Life’, Deleuze simply puts it like this: ‘(It
is) the task of the fabulating function – to invent a people. . . . a bastard
people . . . always becoming, always incomplete’ (Deleuze 1997: 228).
That task requires a certain kind of movement, a certain kind of
fire, and a certain kind of courage, what Foucault names parrhe¯sia
(truth telling) (Foucault [2008] 2011) – the activity of ‘telling it like it
is’ in such a way as to include oneself in the process, the dissemination
and the consequences of that exchange. For Deleuze, this activity, this
movement, is his ‘athleticism’ though one that is ‘embodied’, perhaps
not unsurprisingly, by the move away from any form of collective
will or individual ego-I (Deleuze [1993] 2006: 123–4, 1997). It is, as
Deleuze suggests, an athleticism that is at once both utterly alive and
completely impersonal; one might say, along with Deleuze and Guattari,
a minor form of, in this case, the political and the ethical, alongside a
minor form of literature and art in the most engaging terms imaginable
(Deleuze and Guattari [1975] 1986). It poses a family resemblance
to the Leibnizian ‘compossible’ updated to become nothing less than
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an essential requirement for the building of liberty and freedom of
expression; indeed, an essential requirement to the very folds of life
itself (Deleuze [1993] 2006: 97–138).2 Political with a small ‘p’, this
athleticism is, to misquote Clausewitz, ‘a minor form of warfare by other
means’.3
I. 1926 1515 1968 2004 1957 (Remark on the First
Law of Politics)
Whilst imprisoned under Mussolini’s fascist regime, Antonio Gramsci
famously secreted to the outside world thousands of paper fragments
upon which were written extensive analyses of the role played by culture,
religion, theatre, political philosophy, the state and the economy,
detailing the rise and rise of fascism within Europe (Gramsci [1937]
1975).4 Drawing from Machiavelli’s The Prince, a work dedicated
to the Medici family who had recently come to power and as such
were considered by Machiavelli not yet ‘in the know’, an incarcerated
Gramsci addressed his remarks to the modern version of a prince, that
is, to a disparate ‘not in the know’ rising group – those who included
‘organic’ intellectuals, a new political class of activists, curios, artists
and odd-bods unfamiliar with the minutiae of power, strategy, tactics
and transformation – but nevertheless were in a position to make an
impact, effect massive change and indeed, and despite all odds, lead.
And what was it that both newly emergent groups, four hundred years
apart, needed to know? For Gramsci, as for Machiavelli, it was the first
law of politics; that is, that there are always leaders and led, and, armed
with that knowledge, one must learn to act accordingly. The key to this
mantra lay in the multiple understandings of how the, seemingly eternal,
binaric divide of leaders and led came to be considered always already
so divided, and, given the ‘always already’ in that division, what was to
be meant by the clause ‘one must learn to act accordingly’.
In order to understand how Deleuze and, as a team, Deleuze and
Guattari, answered those questions and, in so doing, tore up the rule
book almost in its entirety, we must turn to a brief history of the deep cut
in modern political philosophy. For despite the often radically distinct
epistemological and practical assumptions emanating from political-
philosophical debate of the nineteenth, twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries, questions around the cohesion of the social whole
(read: society, nation-state, class, community or some combination
thereof) foregrounding the importance of human agency, did so whilst
simultaneously relying on a system or method that required a ‘deep cut’;
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that is, some kind of ‘horizon’ or ‘limit’, ‘lack’ or ‘abyss’ that could
delineate an ‘X’ from its Other. Those deep cut divisions took on various
forms, be it ‘thesis vs anti-thesis’, ‘subject vs object’, ‘phallus vs lack’ or
‘logic vs sense’ and so on, around which their synthetic unity suggested
the totality of the field.5
One could say, without overstating the case too much, that the
primary analytic tool, dialectics –whether speculative, transcendentalist,
realist, materialist or negative (or that which has yet to be
invented) – ruled supreme during this time. It ruled supreme in part
because dialectical analysis did something that earlier transcendental
metaphysics could not quite do: it enabled one to stake a universal truth-
claim as both objectively the case, whilst simultaneously incorporating
as its core ontological assumption, the ever important Enlightenment
concept of change, movement – and in particular a change or a
movement, spearheaded through human intelligence, reason and
sensuous activity. In so doing, dialectics (especially the dialectics of
historical materialism) offered up a way to ‘ground’ thought, without
losing the practico-ethical agency of human intervention in all its
collective and individual incarnations.6
The difficulty remained that this ‘ground’ could only be established
logically via dialectically synthesised contradiction, one which required
as given that all ‘A’ and its point-for-point flipside ‘not-A’ could not
(logically) exceed the field of its generative ratio, could not, as it were,
transform the everyday ‘real’ into something Other except through
negation or by leaving a remainder or producing an excess (or lack)
or maintaining some form of a frontier-horizon.7 Amongst various
interpretations, this meant that although it was important that change be
incorporated within or as part of the logic and, in so doing, be grounded
in the actuality of its movement, for Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari,
this was just old wine in new bottles. ‘The binary logic of dichotomy’,
Deleuze and Guattari protest, ‘has simply been replaced by biunivocal
relationships between successive circles. Binary logic and biunivocal
logic still dominate psychoanalysis [. . .], linguistics, structuralism and
even information science’ (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 2005: 5).
At best this deep cut of dialectical contradiction presented a rather
stunted, overthought picture of realpolitik, from the molecular to
the molar, where difference was thought within the concept, but as
yet, had not been able to conceptualise difference itself. At worst, it
created a sanitised rationality, a flat-footed zero-sum decision-making
pattern incapable of going beyond a ‘propositional mode’. To put this
slightly differently, the deep cut binarisms simply could not account
March 2, 2016 Time: 04:55pm dls.2016.0224.tex
In the Shadow of Akimbo Corporatism 267
for the (uncommon) sensuous, the (impossible to define) strange, the
becoming-x of those not in the know. ‘These were not exactly new
problems,’ sighs Deleuze in the second edition of Difference and
Repetition, ‘since the history of philosophy, and especially contemporary
philosophy, dealt with them constantly’ (Deleuze [1968] 2001: xv).
Continuing, he writes:
But perhaps the majority of philosophers had subordinated difference to
identity or to the Same, to the Similar to the Opposed or to the Analogous:
they had introduced difference into the identity of the concept, they had put
difference in the concept itself, thereby reaching a conceptual difference, but
not a concept of difference. [. . .] This is the classic image of thought, and as
long as the critique has not been carried to the heart of that image it is difficult
to conceive of thought as encompassing those problems which point beyond
the propositional mode. (Deleuze [1968] 2001: xv)
Dismissing this analytic re-cognitive frame as ‘arboreal philosophy’,
whereby method requires a ‘ground’ in the same way as a tree requires
earth to make its identity stand firm, Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari
shift away from the ground itself, rethinking it via a non-arboreal
multiplicity or, as they put it, a ‘vegetal’ logic of sense, a surface logic, a
sporing ‘rhizomatic’ logic with no roots to plumb the ground (as such);
indeed, no ground at all (Deleuze [1968] 2004: xv; Deleuze and Guattari
[1980] 2005: 1–26).8 Instead they posit a ‘sporing’ logic energised and
made real not by an annihilating deep cut of dialectical contradiction,
frontiersmanship horizons or a logos of the limit or lack, but by the much
more attractive stickiness of an ‘encounter’, in the fullest and mutually
lustful, carnal, smelly sense of the term.
II. Breaking Bad: Importance of Belonging, Longing to Be
(Alone)
Quietly borrowing (or perhaps not so quietly borrowing) from
Heidegger’s development of ontological difference, Deleuze and Deleuze
and Guattari’s ‘encounter’ relies on the famous approach by Heidegger
to rethink identity away from the Hegelian requirements of negation,
unity and synthesis (Heidegger [1936–8] 2012, [1957] 1969).9 In line
with Parmenides’ move to emphasise the logic of ò ´ó (the same) as
a belonging (where A = A translates to A belongs to A), this logic does
more than simply denote what could appear as a meaningless tautology;
it implies a vitalised assemblage, that is, an attraction/cohesion or
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enabling of the ‘that which must be thought together’ (Heidegger [1957]
1969: 23–8).10
And what is it for Heidegger ‘that must be thought together’? It is
nothing less and nothing more than the very condition of humanity
itself, now understood at its profoundly naked level as the ‘belonging
together of man [sic] and Being’ (Heidegger [1957] 1969: 30–2). This
‘belonging together’ is not a coordination of two halves; neither is it a
representational turn of events. It has nothing to do with unified wholes,
limits or horizons. It is, instead and precisely, a response, a ‘listening’
response, which, at the moment of that attunement enables, as Heidegger
argues, an event of appropriation to take place, to make a space take
shape, to establish anew ‘the framework’ and, in a word, ‘dwell’.11
Worth quoting at length, Heidegger puts it like this:
How would it be if, instead of tenaciously representing merely a coordination
of the two in order to produce their unity, we were for once to note whether
and how a belonging to one another first of all is at stake in this ‘together’?
[. . .]
Man obviously is a being. [. . .] Man is essentially this relationship of
responding to Being, and he is only this . . . A belonging to Being prevails
within man, a belonging which listens to Being because it is appropriated to
Being. And Being? Let us think of Being according to its original meaning,
as presence. Being is present to man neither incidentally nor only on rare
occasions . . . For it is man, open toward Being, who alone lets Being arrive
as presence. [. . .]
Man and Being are appropriated to each other. They belong to each
other. [. . .] We stubbornly misunderstand this prevailing belonging together
of man and Being as long as we represent everything only in categories
and mediations, be it with or without dialectic. Then we always find only
connections that are established either in terms of Being or in terms of man,
and that present the belonging together of man and Being as intertwining.
We do not as yet enter the domain of the belonging together. How
can such an entry come about? By our moving away from the attitude of
representational thinking. This move is a leap in the sense of a spring. The
spring leaps away, away from the habitual idea of man as the rational animal
who in modern times has become a subject for his objects. Simultaneously,
the spring also leaps away from Being. (Heidegger [1957] 1969: 31–2)
Certainly if one is to stay the course using Heideggerian logic, one
must eventually accept, as did Heidegger, an onto-theo-logical basis to
the (groundless) ground of meaning, a conclusion that Deleuze is not
willing to accept. So Deleuze takes his own conceptual leap, his own
spring away from the Heideggerian ‘rational man’ ‘Being’ event of
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appropriation, without, in so leaping, minimising the importance of
‘the event’ as reciprocal encounter that emphasises a belonging together
which can never represent as fully formed either entities or Being; that is,
as ‘components’ in and of themselves or, for that matter, made to be fully
formed via a (false) sense of posing their identity (belonging together) as
‘unity’. Resonating closer, it would seem, with Bataille’s acephale anti-
mastery of the real (Bataille 1997), Deleuze instead shifts the logic into
its minor key; that is, into a logic of sense rather than an onto-theo-logic
of ‘rational man:Being’ (Deleuze [1969] 1990: 148–53).
This logic of sense is, at a fundamental level not really a logic at
all, if by logic one means a privileging of the analytic-rational, with or
without its reciprocated belonging to Being. It is closer to an ‘a-logic’
as Deleuze calls it or ‘ana-logic’; that is, a re-staging of an embodied
notion of ‘rationality as a thinking that dwells’ to a notion of sense as a
(not-quite-corporeal) raw sensibility that through encounter produces
a thinking that moves, is alive, uncontained, nomadic. To put this
slightly differently, it is a form of encounter activated precisely and
only through patterns, repetitions, series and flights which, via those
patterns, repetitions, series and flights, encounters the whatever, and, in
so ‘encountering’ as Deleuze puts it, ‘forces us to think’ without recourse
to the Concept (Deleuze [1968] 2004: 139–40). Representational unities,
conceptual recognitions are flung from this enframing. ‘It is difficult to
respond to those who wish to be satisfied with words, things, ideas,
images and ideas,’ a weary Deleuze writes in his ‘Third Series of the
Propositions’ (Deleuze [1969] 1990: 19), continuing by adding:
For we may not even say that sense exists in either things or in the mind:
it has neither physical nor mental existence. [. . .] This is why we said that
in fact we can only infer it indirectly, on the basis of the circle where the
ordinary dimensions of the proposition lead us. It is only by breaking open
the circle, as in the case of the Möbius strip, by unfolding and twisting it
that the dimension of sense appears for itself, in its irreducibility . . . (Deleuze
[1969] 1990: 20)
With the move to an emphasis on sense, Deleuze instead privileges – in
an ana-logical rather than hierarchal move – the ‘being of the sensible’
(aisthe¯teon) as, in this instance, ‘the given of the given’ with any
encounter that moves one to think (Deleuze [1968] 2004: 176). In this
way, recognition (in the fullest sense of the term to re-cognise [invent
anew] and recognise [find a rational familiarity]) is not counterpoised to
sense, sensibility or sensuous being; nor is it considered dominant over,
or subsumable to, a logic of sense (Deleuze [1988] 2006: 47–94, [1968]
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2004: 194–208). In the most non-mastery terms available, it means
instead that ‘encounter’ when it ‘works’ –when, that is to say, it makes
one ‘think’, become ‘in-formed’, invent meanings that ‘stick’ – can only
be grasped, imbibed, heard via the being (in/compossible singularities)
of the sensible.12 To try to grasp an encounter ‘rationally’, to try to
‘recognise’ this encounter ‘as such’ would only distort, sterilise or destroy
the very moment of its reciprocality/event of appropriation (Golding
2000). It would invite, as Deleuze so carefully argues in Difference
and Repetition and, later, with Guattari in Anti-Oedipus, too strong
a ‘bearing down’ on the encounter; it would make it stale, make it into
an object, territorialise its meaning (Deleuze [1968] 2004; Deleuze and
Guattari [1972] 2000: 184–9). Over to Deleuze:
Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not
of recognition but of a fundamental encounter. What is encountered may be
Socrates, a temple or a demon. It may be grasped in a range of affective tones:
wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In whichever tone, its primary characteristic is
that it can be sensed. In this sense it is opposed to recognition. In recognition,
the sensible is not at all that which can only be sensed, but that which
bears directly upon the senses in an object, which can be recalled, imagined
or conceived . . . The object of encounter, on the other hand, really gives
rise to the sensible with regard to a given sense. It is not an aisthe¯ton [an
external object of perception] but aisthe¯teon [being of the sensible] . . . It
is not a sensible being but the being of the sensible. It is not the given
but that by which the given is given. It is therefore in a certain sense the
imperceptible [insensible]. It is imperceptible precisely from the point of view
of recognition – in other words from the point of view of an empirical exercise
of the sense in which sensibility grasps only that which also could be grasped
by other faculties. Sensibility, in the presence of that which can only be sensed
(and is at the same time imperceptible) finds itself before its own limit, the
sign, and raises itself to the level of a transcendental exercise: to the ‘nth’
power. [. . .]
[T]hat which can only be sensed (the sentiendum or the being of the
sensible) moves the soul, ‘perplexes’ it – in other words, forces it to pose a
problem. (Deleuze [1968] 2004: 176; original emphasis)13
In shifting to ‘the given of the given’ as the being of the sensible,
Deleuzian encounter replaces the Heideggerian call of Being (and ‘man’s’
almost siren-like response to that call) with something more active,
inventive, non-essentialist, down to earth, sweaty and raw. It is, in
a word, athleticism: the animated sensual sense of a logic, both alive
and impersonal, that makes an encounter ‘work’ (Deleuze and Guattari
[1972] 2000: 140). One could say that this athleticism, as an active,
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constituting of an ana-logic of sense, expresses (and is expressed by)
an always-already historically contingent, multiple singularity; that is,
an ever-present encountering ‘is’ (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 2005:
1–74). As such, it facilitates a radical displacement of ground (as instead,
the profoundly superficial and immanently nomadic surface), whilst
simultaneously enabling a radical replacement of ground, as the being-
with of encounter (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 2005; Nancy 2008).14
In this manner, too, one could also say that this athleticism foregrounds
a kind of habeas corpus without organs and, as it so happens, without
the baggage of two thousand years of Western metaphysics. One could
also say that this move enables a re-think of the very condition(s) – the
reciprocating condition(s) – that make a human and a humanity
‘be’ ‘belong’ without re-instating an ontic in whatever form
of heterotopic groundless ground or binaric horizon or split. This
reciprocating oddly embodied, fractally sliced, impersonal minor move,
this athleticism borne out of a logic of sense, is precisely a move that
enables the conditions upon which ‘a people’ can become (and do
become) human.
One might suggest without sounding overly optimistic or falling
into the dreaded ‘humanist’ trap, that this ana-lytic, this minor logic
of sense offers a small but undeniably upbeat (blood) poetic to this
Being/being called human, warts and all. It is a focus that enables
a profound rethinking of the first law of politics – the always-already
leaders/led deep cut conundrum–without, in so doing, losing sight of
what is at stake: curiosity, imagination, hunger, risk, hurt, friendship,
wonderment, love; that is, the very ‘being of the sensible’ in all its
differently embodied singularities and fractal entanglements, without
organs and without the ego-I. A sticky radically and eternally present
contingency this athleticism, which comes to the fore, erupts and, in that
becoming-eruption, in that fabulation, takes flight.
III. Coding the Political: 2015
One could be forgiven for thinking that even after all the conceptual
gymnastics thus far delineated, we still seem to find ourselves in an
apparently endless return of leaders vs led, Us vs Them or some other
deadly variety on the binary. With wounds so deep and brutal, it is but
a wonder the world has not amputated itself into a hundred thousand
different plateaus, each one a more puerile twist on the other, the
ultimate stomach-wrenching depravity towards which this sorry state
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of affairs seems hell-bent on racing to the bottom to win. The picture is
not pretty and it does not inspire confidence.
So the question must be put: even if Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari
are right; even if the age of which we are a part has so radically
transformed as to make the logic of its presence no longer resembling
(if ever it did) a closed field or even a quasi-transcendentalist one; even
if it is better understood through a ‘vegetal’ philosophy; even after
one catches a glimpse of the importance of oddly embodied sense as
an athleticism to the essential condition of being human; even after
all that and more, the toxic question must be asked again and again:
how does a people, any people, survive (and do more than just simply
survive) the ever proliferating holocausts, gangland skirmishes, global
hedge fund mismanagements, the military–industrial nuclear destruction
agendas, refugee camps, homophobia, racism, radical fundamentalist
religious groups, ecological brutalities, honour killings, the National
Rifle Association, war-rape, not to mention everyday sexism and the
common or garden variety of hatreds and assaults that happen for no
particular reason whatsoever?
One last piece to the puzzle must therefore be addressed. It concerns
the vicissitudes of coding and its relation to ‘athleticism’.
Turning to Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘Savages, Barbarians, Civilised
Men’, they set out the following claims. First, the contemporary world,
they observe, is not, as is usually assumed, constituted by economies of
value – at least not in the first instance (Deleuze and Guattari [1972]
2000: 139–44). Instead, they suggest that the socio-ethico-political
present is constituted by codes, be they nomadic, algorithmic, drifting
or set.15 Second, these codes are not to be understood as ‘secrets’; they
are, rather, the raw sewage of political inscription and as such, they
trump the modernist (and earlier) arguments around state, society and
culture as being foremost an expression of circulation and exchange
(140). Deleuze and Guattari put it thus:
Flows of women and children, flows of herds and of seed, sperm flows, flows
of shit, menstrual flows: nothing escapes coding. [. . .] We see no reason in fact
for accepting the postulate that underlies exchangist [sic] notions of society;
society is not first of all a milieu for exchange where the essential would be
to circulate or to cause to circulate, but rather a socius of inscription where
the essential thing is to mark and to be marked. There is circulation only if
inscription requires or permits it. (Deleuze and Guattari [1972] 2000: 142)
To put this differently, by rethinking the present as an expression
of coding, the emphasis moves away from an arithmetic zero-sum,
either/or, totalising field, to an ana-logical approach around the ‘how’
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of flow, now re-constituted as mobile, nomadic (one could even add
‘cloud’ as well as ‘locative media’ to this list). It includes also the ‘what’
of flow: segmentarities, intensities, nodal points, planes of immanence,
encounters, algorithmic zeroes and ones and so on. In so doing, an
‘a-radical’ rootless enframing of a people comes into play, a ‘socius of
inscription’ as Deleuze and Guattari put it, the collective in-forming, the
collective and creative ability to mark and be marked.
But in the twenty-first-century age of digital transformation and in-
formation technology, this ‘coming into play’ of a collective relationship
to the ‘that’ of marking and especially, of the ‘that’ which makes a mark
‘stick’ (mutate, transform, dissolve, take up arms, take flight) within the
flow and as flow, is itself manifested as a simultaneously discontinuous,
wildly heterogenic ana-logic surface, paradoxically multidimensional,
singular and fractured all in one go. One could say that this is a
terribly flawed game of infinitely exponential and global proportions,
as it can be (and is) played by anyone or any group or any thing:
sperm, menstruation and shit as mentioned above, but also corporate
expansion, drones, ISIS to give but a few headline examples. Nothing
escapes the infinite proliferation of code. But if the game (within the
game) is to mark and be marked then for some of the players this will
literally mean the creating of divisions, divisions that of course include
(indeed privilege) the leaders vs led binaric ‘divide and conquer’ law.
On the other hand, as this is also a world where the playing field is
itself intensely slippery, arched, multiple and corrupt in the fullest sense
of those terms, this play can no longer be heralded as the first law of
politics (or even the last). It is rather a mid-game posed as end-game.
The more brutal it becomes, the more ‘inevitable’ seems its logic.
Which is not to say that nothing can be done; indeed, it is to say
exactly the opposite: for movement and change is ingrained in the flow;
it is not a decision, it is not an opinion; it is not even a fact. It is born
from the realisation that the present is not only inhabitable, but able
to become x. If there is to be a ‘first law of politics’ for a twenty-first
century steeped in digital/information age coding, then let it be precisely
the ‘encounter’ and the arched athleticism that invokes the being of the
sensible to think.
Notes
1. Sudarshan Pattnaik (2015; image courtesy of the artist) Humanity Washed
Ashore: Shame Shame Shame . . . ’, sand sculpture at Puri Beach, 65 km from
Bhubaneswar, Turkey, 4 September 2015. Despite hundreds of thousands
drowning off the shores of various European and Asian ports or suffocating
in the back storage spaces of lorries or freezing to death whilst tucked away in
March 2, 2016 Time: 04:55pm dls.2016.0224.tex
274 Johnny Golding
the landing gear of various airliners, the photograph of young child Aylan Kurdi
washed ashore in his red and blue Western outfit managed to create an enormous
global ground swell of horror and shame. Some governments threw out the term
‘economic migrant’ in favour of ‘war refugee’ and agreed to open their borders.
Other governments went about erecting massive barbed wire borders with armed
patrol guards and dogs. Still others wept with shame but offered only their
tear-stained handkerchief of monetary aid – under the proviso, of course, that
a refugee would come no closer to the West than just outside Syria itself.
2. Suffice to say at this juncture that the Deleuzian refit of Leibniz’s concept of
compossibility is one that enables Deleuze to develop a bold re-think of identity
in a way that sidesteps the usual self-reflexive traps inherent with so-called
identity thinking. Although this point will be developed further, see Leibniz
[23 November 1697] 2006: 31–6.
3. In his famous treatise On War, Clausewitz writes, ‘We see, therefore, that War
is not merely an act of policy, but a true political instrument, a continuation of
political intercourse, carried on with other means. What remains peculiar to war
is simply the peculiar nature of its means. War in general, and the commander
in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy
shall not be inconsistent with the means. That, of course, is no small demand;
but however much it may affect political aims in a given case, it will never do
more than modify them. The political object is the goal, war is the means of
reaching it, and means can never be considered in insolation from their purpose’
(Clausewitz [1832, 1918] 2010: ‘War Is Merely the Continuance of Policy by
other Means’, Book 1, Chapter 1: ‘What Is War?’, §24, p. 99; see also Book 8,
Chapter 6, B: ‘War Is an Instrument of Policy’, pp. 731ff.).
4. Arrested 8 November 1926, Gramsci was sentenced (from May 1928) to twenty
years without parole for ‘attempting to undermine the Italian state’. His twenty-
six volumes of notes collected under the heading of Quaderni del Carcere
[The Prison Notebooks] were secretly protected by various (unnamed) prison
cellmates and removed by visitors including the Cambridge economist, Piero
Sraffa, and Gramsci’s sister-in-law, Tatiana Schultz. Only but a tiny portion of
the notebooks have been translated into English.
5. Hence in some quarters, a continued love affair with the Hegelian dialectic and
its variations on negation, negativity and difference – a love affair sometimes
open, sometimes covert, but in any case one which continues unabated to
this day – embraced by a multitude of otherwise seemingly radical thinkers
from Žižek to the relatively newly emergent ‘object oriented ontologies’ and
‘speculative realism’ scholars. For some of the best philosophical blogs duelling
it out with respect to this and other post-discursive relationships to Hegel
and Lacan (including Deleuze’s relationship to Lacan) see the irrepressible
larvalsubjects at <http://www.larvalsubjects.wordpress> , especially ‘Lacan
and Deleuze: A Pet Peeve’, 22 May 2006 at <https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.
com/2006/05/22/lacan-and-deleuze-a-pet-peeve/#comments> (accessed 3 April
2015). See also the complex conceptual variations on ‘limit’, ‘horizon’ and
‘difference’ in the work of Butler, Laclau, Mouffe Critchley and Marchart
(Critchley and Marchart: 2004).
6. To do otherwise, that is, to accept a profoundly discursive, immanent and/or
genealogical ‘groundless ground’ approach, often brought with it the usual
accusations of ‘nihilism’, ‘mediocre’, ‘naïve’, ‘fascistic’ or some combination
thereof. See, for example, many of the earlier works of Christopher Norris
(from 1993 onwards), though his most recent text (2013) seems to recant much
of the hardline positions he along with many others so passionately upheld
in the past.
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7. This is not to ignore the praxilogical importance of hegemony, contingency,
universality and equivalency so thoroughly debated from the mid-1980s
onwards and importantly discussed in Verso’s critical Radical Thinkers series.
Rather, it is to remind those who need reminding that those argument(s), crucial
though they may be for rethinking non-essentialism and political resistance, still
can be reduced to the problem of (or need for) ‘excess’ ‘horizon’ or ‘lack’ as the
fundamental principle for democratic (or indeed any kind of) struggle. Laclau
puts it thus: ‘There is no politics without the creation of political frontiers,
but creating such frontiers is more difficult when one cannot cannot rely on
stable entities (such as the “classes” of Marxist discourse) but has to construct
through political action the very social entities which have to be emancipated.
This, however, is the political challenge of our age’ (Butler et al. 2000: 306).
8. ‘[Instead] we invoked a vegetal model of thought: the rhizome in opposition
to the tree, a rhizome-thought instead of an arborescent thought’ (Deleuze
[1968] 2004: vi, xv). Cf. Deleuze [1968] 2004: 164–213 (ch. III, ‘The Image of
Thought’); Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 2005: 3–25 (‘Introduction: Rhizome’),
208–31 (ch. 9, ‘Micropolitics and Segmentarity’).
9. There is not sufficient space to develop in detail the delectable range of
Heideggerian collectibles that Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari (as well as so
many other contemporary and continental philosophers) specifically rely upon
to greater or lesser degrees. For the purposes of the argument being advanced
here, see Heidegger [1936–8] 2012, especially 133–78 (‘III. The Interplay’),
179–230 (‘IV. The Leap’), 231–312 (‘V. The Grounding’). See also Heidegger’s
Freiburg lectures given in the summer of 1951 and 1952 (Heidegger [1954]
1968) and perhaps most significantly, as mentioned above, Heidegger [1957]
(1969).
10. ‘The obvious thing to do,’ writes Heidegger, ‘would be to represent this
belonging together in the sense of identity as it was thought and generally
understood later on. What could prevent us? None other than the principle itself,
which we read in Parmenides. For it says something else – it says that Being,
together with thinking, belongs in the Same. [. . .] The Sameness of thinking and
Being that speaks in Parmenides’ fragment stems from further back than the kind
of identity defined by metaphysics in terms of Being as a characteristic of Being’
(Heidegger [1957] 1969: 28).
11. Heidegger will further complicate the notion of encounter/event of
appropriation/dwelling/clearing to introduce the crucial concept of ‘framework’,
a muscular, vital move that enables one to situate the epistemological (ontic)
move, which we do not have scope in this essay to develop now. Cf. Heidegger
[1957] 1969: 33–4 (‘The Principle of Identity’), 40–74 (‘The Onto-Theo-Logical
Constitution of Metaphysics’). On the development of Deleuze and Guattari’s
use of attunement, see Golding 2010.
12. The importance of Deleuze’s development of the Leibnizian notions of
compossible and incompossible must be highlighted, but cannot be developed
here given the limitations of space. Suffice just to note here Deleuze’s use of
the terms. In his ‘Twenty-fourth Series of Communication’, he writes: ‘For what
Leibniz called “compossible” and “incompossible” cannot be reduced to the
identical and contradictory, which govern only the possible and impossible. [. . .]
Compossibility must be defined at an original level in a pre-individual level,
by the convergence of series which singularities of events form as they stretch
themselves out over lines of ordinary points. Incompossibility must be defined
by the divergence of such series’ (Deleuze [1969] 1990: 171).
13. Bracketed translation: J. Golding. I have chosen to maintain the Greek
translation of aisthe¯teon as meaning ‘the being of the sensible’ rather than use
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the English translation in Difference and Repetition as ‘sign’ since the latter
may give rise to a misuse of linguistic (semiotic) representational thinking. But
see also Rancière’s ([2000] 2011) use of aisthe¯ton and its development of the
aesthetic sensible.
14. Cf. Nancy 2008.
15. For an important political-aesthetic development of code as ‘drift’, see Kroker
and Kroker 2010.
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